Deviations from normality in financial return series have led to the development of alternative portfolio selection models. One such model is the downside risk model, whereby the investor maximizes his return given a downside risk constraint. In this paper, we empirically observe the international equity allocation for the downside risk investor using nine international markets' returns over the last 34 years. The results hold for both daily and monthly data; and also from an international perspective. Due to greater downside risk, investors may think globally, but instead act locally. The model's results therefore provide an alternative view of the home bias puzzle.
Introduction
Despite greater integration of international capital markets, investors continue to hold portfolios largely dominated by domestic assets. By the end of 2003, US investors held only 14% of their equity portfolios in foreign stocks, whilst such stocks accounted for 54% of world market capitalisation (see Thomas et al., 2004) . Worldwide this lack of international diversification remains a puzzle to financial economists. Lewis (1999) suggests that a US investor, maximising a mean-variance portfolio strategy should hold at least 40% in foreign stocks. Because such a high allocation is not seen in practise, assuming a mean-variance strategy from a theoretical point of view, there are two explanations.
Either, investors' expectations of future returns abroad are consistently lower than what finance theory predicts. In which case, investors appear to be pessimistic about foreign markets whilst relatively optimistic about their domestic market. Recent research has addressed this issue of lower expected returns being due to estimation error in the mean vector of returns (Hasan and Simaan, 2000) . Information and transaction costs from foreign investment can also reduce the returns earned; although this has become less important as an explanation due to the globalization of financial markets over the recent decade.
Or alternatively, assuming returns from investing abroad are as high as expected, another way of looking at the puzzle is that investors perceive the risk from investing abroad as greater than what the current theory predicts. In the mean-variance framework, this means that the risk from foreign equity investment is higher than is currently captured using the standard deviation of the historical returns. As French and Poterba (1991) point out this could be due to the relative unfamiliarity with foreign markets and institutions. Meaning that certain risks, such as sovereign risk or transfer risk, are larger than perceived and not fully captured in the standard deviation as the correct estimate for risk. The underlying assumption in a mean-variance world is that all risks facing an investor, in his decision to invest in foreign equity, are fully captured by the standard deviation of returns. It is this limiting assumption which we relax in our investigation of the home equity bias.
In this paper, we focus on a more general definition for risk as an explanation in resolving the puzzle. It appears that the risk of foreign investment is greater than previously thought resulting in the benefit from diversifying internationally being reduced. We therefore use a definition for risk which empirically captures this greater risk by specifying a model using downside equity risk.
In our analysis we focus on the empirical distribution of returns. In doing so, we can move away from the limiting assumption of normally distributed returns and the implicit assumption that the standard deviation captures all the risk inherent in financial time series. The advantage of this is that any non-normalities in the data enter the investor's decision in the optimal portfolio strategy.
It is well known that empirical time series are non-normal, however, to our knowledge nonnormalities have not been modelled as an explanation to the home bias. In risk management higher moments of the returns distribution, namely skewness and kurtosis, are commonly used to capture additional risk in the tails of the empirical return distribution. By focusing on the empirical distribution and a more general definition of downside risk, we are able to capture any non-normalities in the data, stemming from skewed and kurtotic financial time series and incorporate the effects of any additional risk occurring from these higher moments in the data.
One non-parametric model for portfolio optimization is the mean-downside risk model developed by Campbell et al. (2001) . This model is able to optimize an investor's portfolio of risky assets by maximising the mean-downside-risk portfolio under the assumption of a parametric distribution for the returns, or alternatively in a non-parametric manner, by using the empirical distribution of returns. The use of the empirical distribution is a particularly interesting case since it has the benefit of including any non-normalities in the data into the optimal portfolio decision. Given certain parametric restrictions the model is consistent with capital market equilibrium. 1 We, therefore, focus on downside risk as the appropriate measure for risk. We model the investor's optimal portfolio allocation using a mean-downside risk optimization model. The investor is constrained by the desire to prevent his initial level of wealth falling below a given threshold. The higher the threshold the more safety the investor requires and the less tolerant he is to risk. Downside risk increases as the level of safety which an investor requires on his initial investment becomes greater. If the perceived risk from foreign investment results in a higher probability of exceeding the threshold occurring, the investor will choose to invest more domestically and less in foreign equity.
By employing a downside risk portfolio allocation model and using data on international equity markets we provide empirical results to determine the extent of the risk-return tradeoff facing investors in international financial markets. Due to greater downside risk the results provide evidence of a greater risk-return trade-off in international equity markets than previously acknowledged for investors with a low level of risk tolerance. We also include emerging market data and short selling constraints. From this we are able to offer a plausible empirical explanation to the home equity bias. The empirical results are robust over various perspectives, taking both the view of a UK and a Japanese investor; as well as when using higher frequency data. Due to the greater downside risk from investing internationally, investors may think globally, but instead act locally.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the following section we discuss the home bias phenomenon and previous explanations. Section 3 introduces the concept of downside risk, its behavioural foundations and specifies the optimal asset allocation under downside risk. By using data on international equity markets, Section 4 investigates, in a detailed empirical study, how the downside risk approach assesses the risk-return trade-off for various confidence levels associated with increasing levels of investors' risk aversion. Our aim is to offer additional insight into how the downside risk approach is able to provide an alternative risk-return tradeoff for assessing investors' desires to invest internationally. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
The home bias phenomenon
The work of French and Poterba (1991) is probably the most prominent among the numerous studies which document the home equity bias. They report that investors in the US, Japan, and the UK allocate 94%, 98%, and 82% of their respective equity investment, to domestic shares. Tesar and Werner (1995) study the long-term investment patterns of five major OECD countries and find supporting evidence for the home bias. They demonstrate that international investment positions are well below the current limitations on foreign holdings of institutional investors. Kang and Stulz (1997) present further evidence that the preference for domestic equity holdings is an international phenomenon.
A simple mean-variance illustration based on the sample moments of returns implies that US investors' optimal weight in foreign equities is about 40%. Hence, the point estimates of the mean and the covariance matrix of returns suggest that US investors would benefit by increasing the extent of their international equity diversification. Warnock (2002) shows that although the US equity home bias has lessened somewhat over the past two decades, it still remains high. Thomas et al. (2004) conclude that by the end of 2003, US investors held only 14% of their equity portfolios in foreign stocks at a time when such stocks accounted for 54% of the world market capitalisation. This gap between investors' actual and presumably optimal behaviour has motivated several studies in the search to find an explanation to this home bias phenomenon.
One perplexing fact is the large home bias found in small and medium sized countries. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) conclude that domestic equity investment, as a fraction of total portfolio equity, ranges from 65% in France to 100% in Sweden. Small countries, whose equity comprises a small fraction of the global mean-variance efficient portfolio, would presumably have the most to gain from international diversification.
Common explanations for the pervasive home bias puzzle include barriers to international investment and transaction costs, information asymmetries and higher estimation uncertainty for foreign than domestic stocks, hedging demand for stocks with smaller positive correlation with domestic state variables such as inflation risk or non-traded assets such as human capital, and sovereign risk.
2 However, these common explanations seem less reasonable in today's increasingly integrated financial world.
None of these common explanations have provided a satisfactory quantitative account of the observed home bias in international financial markets. For example, Lewis (1999) points out that the first group of explanations is weakened by the obstacles to international investment falling substantially over the last thirty years and the existence of large gross investment flows. Ahearne et al. (2004) confirm that measurable transaction costs fail to explain the observed home bias. Pastor (2000) concludes that it is also far from clear that estimation uncertainty provides a good explanation. The second explanation is weakened by the magnitude with which foreign stocks should be correlated more strongly with domestic risk factors compared with domestic stocks. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) argue that this phenomenon cannot be explained by either inflation hedging or the directly observable costs of international investment. They show that correlations with deviations from purchasing power parity can even exacerbate the home bias puzzle. Baxter and Jermann (1997) indicate that the puzzle cannot be explained when the importance of human capital is accounted for, since investors should short sell their national stock market because of its high correlation with its human capital. Finally, sovereign risk, which comprises economic and political risk, seems to apply more to emerging market countries than to other mature financial markets, so cannot be a significant explanation.
Although many of these barriers to foreign investment have substantially diminished, the tendency to invest in the respective domestic country remains very strong. Recent research suggests that the home bias puzzle may be part of a larger phenomenon in which investors exhibit a preference for familiar companies. A number of empirical studies have established an analogue to the home bias within countries themselves.
A company's language, culture, and distance from the investor are three central attributes that might enlighten investors' preferences for certain stocks. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) point out that a typical equity portfolio of a US money manager consists of firms that are located in the 100-mile vicinity of his workplace than the average firm. Huberman (2001) analyzes the geographic distribution of shareholders of US Regional Bell Operating Companies and shows that investors are much more likely to hold shares in their local providers. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that investors in Finland are more likely to hold stocks of companies which are located close to them geographically, which use their native tongue in company reports, and whose chief executives have the same cultural background. Finally, a recent study by Karlsson and Norden (2004) shows that age, gender, net wealth, occupation and familiarity with risky investments play a crucial role in the decision to allocate assets in foreign equities.
These studies offer empirical evidence that people favour stocks with which they are familiar, and which they believe are more likely to deliver higher returns at lower stock-specific risk. This biases portfolio weights toward familiar stocks. Familiarity may represent information available to the investor, but not yet available in the market. Or it may represent the investors' illusion that he has superior information now or a belief that he will potentially have superior information in the future.
Although it is possible for investors to have superior information about companies located nearer to their home, they may also choose to invest in firms in close proximity because of (perceived) expertise. Agents may invest in familiar securities because they prefer to take a stake in a context in which they consider themselves to be knowledgeable and competent. This is defined by Heath and Tversky (1991) as the 'competence hypothesis'. Experimental evidence provided by Kilka and Weber (2001) suggest that agents feel more capable and are relatively more optimistic about their home equity market.
3 This optimism, in turn, translates into greater investment in familiar companies.
Following Barberis and Thaler (2002) , experimental evidence suggests that people dislike situations in which they are uncertain about the probability distribution of a gamble. Such circumstances are known as 'situations of ambiguity', while the general dislike for these kinds of situations are known as 'aversion to ambiguity'. 4 Ambiguity aversion translates into significant carefulness by investors with regard to unknown stocks.
Familiarity and aversion to ambiguity offer a simple way of understanding sub-optimal international asset allocation. Investors may find their national stock markets more familiar and, thus, less ambiguous than foreign stock indices. Since familiar assets are attractive, people invest heavily in those, and invest little or nothing in ambiguous assets. Therefore, their portfolios appear undiversified relative to the predictions of standard finance models. Goetzmann and Kumar (2001) argue that although agents on some occasions appear to have a vague impression that diversification might be beneficial, they still fail to diversify their financial investments adequately.
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All the explanations for the home equity bias result in greater risk from investing internationally. This risk is captured implicitly in the empirical return distribution using the domestic currency. When assuming a parametric distribution as a generalizing assumption for the empirical distribution of returns, as is common in most modeling applications, any additional risk in the form of deviations from the Gaussian normal distribution is lost. To include these factors, we adopt a model which is able to focus on the empirical distribution of returns for optimal portfolio allocation. One such model which focuses on the empirical distribution is the downside risk model of Campbell et al. (2001) .
The concept of downside risk in financial markets
It is commonly accepted that investors care more about downside loss, than upside gain. Roy (1952) first proposed the 'safety first' approach to portfolio optimization as early as 1952. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) used loss aversion preferences, and Gul (1991) used disappointment aversion so that investors could place a greater weight on the loss than on their gains. Advances in behavioural finance research can help us to determine how investors perceive risk. Many of the advances centre on the inadequacies behind some of the axioms on which expected utility theory is based. Rather than imposing a rigid framework for investor preferences, behavioural finance allows for non-standard behaviour. This is driven by quasi-rational behaviour or nonstandard preferences, which is often based on empirical and/or experimental findings.
Research in the area of behavioural finance has shown results that contradict the axioms and assumptions of expected utility theory. Under expected utility, an equal diversification of risks is optimal, but under prospect theory, conversely, risk concentration will be most favourable. The intuitive reason behind this strong result is that a prospect theory agent is risk-seeking over losses. Investors' attitudes change over the domain of the utility function and differ between negative and positive domains; thus individual investors treat gains and losses differently. The crucial features of prospect theory which drive this outcome are the investors' degree of loss aversion and in particular their diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses. Loss aversion implies that changes are evaluated as gains and losses compared to a reference point, with losses looming larger than gains. It is for these reasons we choose to focus on downside risk, in a model for optimal portfolio allocation.
To recapitulate, there are two advantages from using this model. Firstly, the risk to the investor from investing abroad is specified relative to a benchmark, which in this case is the domestic risk free rate. This results in the advantage of an investors' decision being made with reference to his home country. The second advantage is the benefit of using a non-parametric distribution for the optimization. By moving away from the restrictive assumption of normality, we are able to observe irregularities in the data, and the effect of any additional risk occurring from either negative skewness and/or fat tailed distributions.
We apply the downside risk model from Campbell et al. (2001) for portfolio allocation under a downside risk constraint. This model builds upon the model of Arzac and Bawa (1977) , however, focuses on the loss in terms of Value-at-Risk rather than simply specifying an admissible probability of failure. The investor's budget constraint is defined as the following equation for initial wealth W(0) and borrowing B:
The investor chooses the fractions of asset i, g(i) to be invested at time 0. The investor is assumed to allocate the assets in the portfolio, and to choose the amount to borrow or lend so that the expected level of final wealth is maximized. Investor preferences in the 'safety first' world are such that he or she wishes to be c% confident that the final value of the portfolio at time T will not fall below a given downside risk level. The level of downside risk is captured in the downside risk constraint, with the desired level of absolute Value-at-Risk, denoted VaR: Pr fWðT; pÞ Wð0Þ À VaRg ð1 À cÞ: ð2Þ
Because we are focusing solely on the risk of losses, our measure for risk depends on the downside only. Hence, the expected wealth from investing in portfolio p at the end of the investment horizon becomes:
Campbell et al. (2001) derive that the optimal asset allocation occurs when Eq. (3) is maximized. This results in maximising Eq. (4):
where r( p) and r f are the returns on the portfolio and the risk free rate, respectively. Thus, the numerator is the risk premium and the denominator is the expression for risk, defined as follows:
The level of risk aversion depends crucially on the confidence level associated with the investors' downside risk constraint: the more safety the investor requires, the higher the confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint and the less tolerant the investor is to risk. In this way the higher the confidence level c, the more risk averse is the investor.
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One of the features, which the downside model also incorporates, is an investors' notion of regret. The investor assesses the risk from an investment, with reference to the value the initial wealth would have attained if invested over the period at the risk free rate. 7 The investor, therefore, uses the risk free rate of return as the benchmark to assess the potential allocation strategy. Risk is assessed relative to a benchmark return. For example, the average level of consumption or the deviation from the risk free rate of return.
Empirical analysis
In this section we employ the downside risk model using empirical data. In a first step, we are able to observe the risk-return trade-offs for the US domestic and international markets. We see how the risk-return differs from the consumption-based approach to asset pricing, and discuss the results of modeling the optimal asset allocation under downside risk.
We use monthly data from the MSCI indices in US dollars for the G7 countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, as well as the 3 month Treasury Bill for the risk free rate, from Datastream. The data are available from January 1970 to December 2004 for the MSCI indices. Unfortunately the data for Emerging Markets, such as for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Korea and Thailand, only date back to January 1988, so we focus on Hong Kong and Singapore only. Summary statistics for the series are given in Table 1 .
Over the sample period, Hong Kong had the highest average monthly return, translating into an average annual return of 15.2%. It was also the most volatile, with a variance of 39.2% on an annual basis. Singapore was the second most volatile market with 24.8% annual volatility and an average annual return of 10.8%. These returns were slightly higher in the UK, which averaged an 11.0% annual return, and also less volatile with 14.1% annual variance. The US was the least volatile market with a 6.9% annual variance, and with a 10.2% average return. Importantly the correlation statistics in Table 2 indicate benefits from diversification for the US investor, investing in foreign equity markets. Correlations range from 0.328 with Japan to 0.728 with Canada.
Returning back to Table 1 we can also see that apart from the Japanese MSCI, all the other series have highly significant excess kurtosis. The JarqueeBera test rejects the hypothesis that The table gives the unconditional correlation between the G7 MSCI equity indices and the Emerging Markets Hong Kong and Singapore using the monthly MSCI data as described in Table 1 for the period from January 1970 to December 2004. these series are normally distributed. This will result in excess downside risk to the investor when observed from a US perspective. It is likely to be caused by the additional risks from investing internationally. Given the apparent non-normality in the data, we look at how the downside risk model optimizes an international portfolio of equities, and compare the results to the mean-variance investor.
US perspective without short selling constraints
Using the monthly data on the MSCI indices we optimize Eq. (4), focusing on the US as the domestic country. We maximize the expected return over and above the US risk free rate. This perspective is important since we focus on the US as the home market. We use all combinations of portfolios containing all G7 equity markets over the downside risk of each portfolio combination. The optimization is performed for each confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint. We chose the 95%, 97.5% and 99% confidence levels which are commonly used in risk management. We are therefore able to determine how much a US investor is likely to invest in foreign equities. In this way we can focus on the home equity bias from the US investors' perspective.
The model does not require any assumptions to be made as to the nature of the distribution. We derive optimal portfolios using both the empirical returns and for multivariate normally distributed returns. Alternative parametric distributions could also be used. The results are shown in Table 3 and are depicted in Fig. 1 .
The assumption of normality in the model results in the same optimal portfolio allocation over the G7 countries. Regardless of the confidence level chosen in the downside risk constraint the US investor chooses to allocate between 64% and 65% of his portfolio in the domestic market. The slight variation in the allocation is due to sampling error. As mentioned before this allocation is almost identical to the mean-variance optimal portfolio. The difference is due to the positive risk free rate in the denominator of Eq. (4).
Taking the empirical distribution enables us to observe an investor's allocation at different confidence levels without having to impose the assumption of normality on the model. This has the advantage of observing how non-normalities affect the optimal portfolio allocation. Because we focus on the tail of the distribution using high confidence levels in the downside risk constraint, the effect from non-normalities is more pronounced. In Table 3 we see that as the confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint increases, the optimal allocation The table gives the optimal portfolio selection for an international equity portfolio in the G7 MSCI equity indices for a US investor. Optimal allocations are found for a variety of confidence levels using both the empirical distribution and under the assumption of bivariate normality, using the monthly MSCI data as described in Table 1. in the US market also increases. The model is able to capture the additional downside risk in the empirical distribution and investors who are highly concerned about the value of their portfolio dropping below a certain level of wealth prefer to 'play safe' and opt to hold a larger proportion of their portfolio in the domestic market. This is further highlighted in Fig. 1 . Optimizing the model using the empirical distribution, we can see two very important phenomena. Firstly, the US investor allocates a greater proportion of his portfolio to the domestic market as the confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint increases. This means that as investors require greater levels of certainty with their investments, investors become more concerned about the value of their portfolio not dropping below a certain level. The greater the confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint, the more averse the investor is to downside risk. Secondly, the allocation in the domestic portfolio is greater than would be the case using mean-variance portfolio optimization.
Interestingly, the more averse the investor becomes to downside risk, the greater the proportion of their total portfolio allocated into the domestic asset. This is a significant result. Under the assumption of normality, the proportion held in the domestic market is constant, regardless of the confidence level chosen in association with the downside risk.
8 This is because the quantile of the distribution is assumed to be a function of the standard deviation of the distribution. For example, the 95% level for the Value-at-Risk in the downside risk constraint is a 1.95 multiple of the standard deviation, and for the 99% level, a multiple of 2.33 is used. This means that the optimal allocation is independent from the quantile level; hence the optimization results in the same international allocations. It is the assumption of normality which results in the same portfolio of risky assets.
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When a non-parametric distribution is used, the portfolio of risky assets changes with the assumption of the confidence level associated with the risk free rate because of irregularities in the data. It is the non-parametric nature of the model which results in a changing optimal allocation of risky assets. This enables us to include the investors' domicile in the decision to invest internationally. Using the notion of regret, regret is higher when investing abroad, since the deviation from the benchmark is potentially greater. Thus the confidence level associated with the investor's downside risk constraint is higher.
To explain the well-documented lack of international diversification by US investors, the confidence level chosen by the investor must be substantial. From our empirical results using the G7 countries, the risk aversion level of the representative investor is associated with a confidence level on the downside risk constraint of nearly 97.5% on a monthly basis.
Including the emerging market data and optimizing the portfolio for the downside risk investor using both, the empirical distribution and the assumption of normality, our model provides us with similar results. Under the assumption of normally distributed returns the US investor would allocate between 67% and 68%. Using the empirical distribution the allocation is greater than under the assumption of normality for the highest confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint. Again, the allocation into the domestic market becomes greater as the investor desires a greater degree of confidence in his downside risk constraint. The more averse to risk he becomes, the greater the allocation into US equities.
US perspective with short selling constraints
Until now we have not allowed for short selling constraints in the portfolio optimization. Taking short sale constraints into consideration, we find a slightly lower allocation in the domestic market under the assumption of normally distributed returns. The optimal allocation in the US would be slightly lower at 60%. Using the empirical distribution we find that at lower levels of confidence associated with the downside risk constraint the results are consistent with those without short selling constraints. However, at the 99% level of confidence, we observe a lower level of investment in US equity. This is compensated by a significantly greater proportion of the portfolio devoted to Canadian equity, which is highly correlated with the US market. Furthermore, the US investor also prefers to allocate a greater proportion to Japanese equity. This in itself is an interesting result since the allocation is the optimal point using the empirical distribution and is, no doubt, driven by greater normality in the data. Indeed the higher allocation is in line with the allocation into Japanese equity for the mean-variance investor and the assumption of normally distributed returns. Japan presents the investor with less downside risk, resulting from the less kurtotic returns in the extreme tail of the distribution. Japan attracts the highly constrained US investor to invest a greater proportion into its market. It would appear that at such a high level of aversion to downside risk, the US investor prefers to substitute a relatively large proportion of his US equity holdings for the apparent safety of the Japanese market. Remember from Table 1, the return series observed over the 34 year period from the Japanese equity market was not significantly different from normal. Thus the downside risk was less in this period than for all other equity markets considered. It appears that under short selling restrictions, the risk to the US investor from extreme market movements (in the bottom 1% of the quantile of the distribution) is less than the additional risk of investing abroad. Only in such a case is he willing to substitute the additional risk from investing abroad for the safety of less extreme market fluctuations (Figs. 2 and 3) .
This result may also be emphasized by the low correlation coefficient between the two markets. The correlation between the US and Japan is the lowest of all the equity markets considered, even including the two emerging markets. The effects from extreme market movements, coupled with size conditional correlation coefficients, are intrinsically captured in the empirical data; but are lost when parameterization of the distribution occurs for modeling asset allocation.
Empirical research has shown that as we move further into the tails of the distribution, where extreme events occur, the correlation between international markets increases, and hence the benefits to diversification are reduced. 10 In the downside risk framework, for optimal asset allocation we need not assume a constant coefficient for the joint distribution of returns. Conditional correlation effects are captured in the empirical estimate for correlation so the effects of increasing correlation coefficients are inherently captured. It is highly likely that the effect of increasing correlation in the left tail of the distribution accounts for the changing empirical optimum. This effect is not captured under normality, where correlation is assumed to be constant over the distribution. In the downside risk framework, because we are not required to impose any restrictive modeling assumptions as to the nature of the parametric distribution for the joint return series, the impact of non-normalities in the data can be observed and incorporated into the decision to invest internationally. Since the conditional correlation coefficients between markets are captured in the measure for downside risk, if there are any increases in conditional correlation the benefits from investing internationally decrease, and the model is able to pick up these attributes through the use of the empirical distribution. The results enable us to see how important the conditional correlation coefficient becomes in the decision to hold international assets, and the use of the empirical distribution enables us to correctly assess the true underlying downside risk of investing in foreign equity.
If it is the case that investors focus on a high confidence level, where correlation is higher between international financial markets, then the benefits to international diversification are reduced dramatically, through greater downside equity risk. The results, therefore, indicate a rational explanation of the lack of international diversification and the phenomenon of the home bias, where investors are generally worried about potential downside losses. The model provides an alternative view of the risk-return trade-off in international financial markets, without having to resort to very high levels of relative risk aversion.
US perspective and daily data
To check the robustness of our empirical results we extend our original dataset and employ daily data from the Datastream total return indices in US dollars for all G7 countries: Canada, Fig. 3 . International diversification for US investors including short selling constraints. The figure gives the optimal portfolio selection for an international equity portfolio in the G7 MSCI equity indices and Emerging Market indices for a US investor including the effects from short selling constraints. Optimal allocations are found using the empirical distribution, using monthly data from January 1970 to December 2004, and under the assumption of multivariate normality, for a variety of confidence levels.
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US, as well as the 3 month Treasury Bill for the risk free rate. The daily data are only available from January 1973 to December 2004. For consistency with our previous results we only focus on Hong Kong and Singapore as emerging markets only. Summary statistics for the series are given in Table 5 . The table gives the optimal portfolio selection for an international equity portfolio in the G7 MSCI equity indices and the Emerging Markets Hong Kong and Singapore for a US investor. Optimal allocations are found for a variety of confidence levels using both the empirical distribution and under the assumption of bivariate normality, using the monthly MSCI data as described in Table 1 . The table gives the summary statistics using daily data for the G7 Datastream total return equity indices, and the Emerging Market equity indices available as from January 1973 to December 2004.
Taking a slightly shorter time horizon meant the countries average returns and standard deviations differ on an annual basis to the data in Table 1 . For example, Singapore now had the highest average daily return with 0.107%. It was also the most volatile, with a daily variance of 0.029. Hong Kong was the second most volatile market with 0.019 daily volatility and an average daily return of 0.047%. These returns were slightly less than in France, which averaged a 0.049% daily return, but a less volatile 0.012 daily variance. Canada was the least volatile market with a 0.009 daily variance, but with a 0.038% average daily return. Correlation statistics in Table 6 again indicate diversification benefits for the US investor, investing in foreign equity market, ranging from 0.644 with Canada over 0.376 with the UK to 0.063 with Japan.
Returning back to Table 5 we can also see that all daily return series have highly significant excess kurtosis. As in the monthly data analysis, the JarqueeBera test rejects in all cases the hypothesis that these series are normally distributed. This will result in excess downside risk to the investor, apparent in the data, when observed from a US perspective.
Using the data on the daily indices we again optimize Eq. (4), focusing on the US as the domestic country, following the same procedure as for the monthly data, however, the use of daily data results in over 8300 daily observations and a far greater number of portfolio combinations in the optimization process. In Table 7 we show the results obtained when optimizing the model using the empirically observed distribution to the assumption of parameterizing the model using the normal distribution.
Using daily data and including emerging markets, we see that under the assumption of normality the US investor would allocate a lower optimal allocation in the US market for the sample period, around 30%. The use of the empirical distribution results in a similar increasing allocation when using daily rather than monthly data. Comparing the results here to Table 4 the results are robust to the increase in the frequency of the observations. Interestingly the extent of the home bias captured in the empirical data is similar. The results are again highlighted in Fig. 4 .
Taking short sale constraints into consideration, as in the case of monthly data, a similar pattern arises and the empirical results of the daily data are highly consistent with those without short selling constraints. The phenomenon that the home bias is slightly less at the 99% level of confidence when short selling constraints are included also appears. Fig. 5 indicates this. There The table gives the unconditional correlation between the G7 Datastream total return equity indices and for the Emerging Markets Hong Kong and Singapore using daily data as described in Table 5 for the period from January 1973 to December 2004.
is a larger allocation into the Japanese market at the 99% confidence level over the 97.5% level, however, there is no dominant pattern. This could be due to all series exhibiting non-normalities with highly kurtotic returns. It appears that under short selling restrictions, the risk to the US investor from extreme market movements is less than the additional risk of investing abroad. Only in such a case is he willing to substitute the additional risk from investing abroad for the safety of less extreme market fluctuations.
International perspective
In this section we extend our analysis to analyze whether the observed home bias phenomenon from a US investors' perspective is an international phenomenon. In order to check for the robustness of our empirical results, we analyze the optimal portfolio allocation from the perspective of a Japanese and a UK investor, respectively. This allows us to answer the question of whether this observed phenomenon has an exchange rate component.
Using the monthly data we optimize Eq. (4), focusing on both Japan and the UK as the domestic countries. 11 We maximize the expected return over and above the Japanese and UK risk free The table gives the optimal portfolio selection for an international equity portfolio in the G7 equity indices and the Emerging Markets Hong Kong and Singapore for a US investor. Optimal allocations are found for a variety of confidence levels using both the empirical distribution and under the assumption of bivariate normality, using the daily data from Datastream as described in Table 5 .
rates, respectively. We use all combinations of portfolios containing all G7 equity markets over the downside risk of each portfolio combination. As in the case of the US investor, the optimization is done for each confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint. This allows us to determine how much a Japanese or a UK investor is likely to invest in foreign equities. Table 8 shows the results obtained when optimizing the model using both the empirically observed distribution and the assumption of parameterized model using the normal distribution. We find for monthly data that the allocation in the domestic market is negative under the assumption of normally distributed returns. However, when using the empirical distribution in the model we find the allocation is both positive and significantly higher at higher confidence levels associated with the downside risk constraint. It appears that the downside risk of extreme market movements is larger for foreign investments in equity than for the domestic market. The proportion allocated into the domestic market is also higher as the confidence level in the downside risk constraint increases. This is a significant result. The results indicate that the model is robust to the choice of domestic country.
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The model is able to capture the international nature of the home bias puzzle by focusing on the downside risk and the additional tail risk in equity market movements. Table 9 displays the empirical results of the portfolio allocation for both a Japanese and a UK, investor, respectively, when using daily data, again including emerging markets and no short selling restrictions.
We can observe again an international home bias from the perspective of the UK, however, the results are less robust for the Japanese investor. To recapitulate, the international home bias phenomenon is to a large degree captured in the downside risk model for optimal portfolio selection. The results are both robust to monthly and daily data series as well as from an international perspective.
International Diversification US Investor

Concluding remarks
The home equity bias puzzle can be framed as a result of the empirical risk-return trade-off being larger than otherwise captured in current finance theory. Either returns are lower than expected, or risk perceptions are higher from investing in foreign equity. This results in foreign equity markets being less attractive to domestic US investors. Although many explanations have been given as to the various elements involved in determining any additional risk to the investor from investing in foreign corporate equity, the assumption is maintained that the variance of the empirical distribution adequately captures the risk facing the investor. Even when additional types of risks and costs are factored into the standard expected utility and mean-variance framework, the degree of risk aversion still necessary to result in such a high allocation into the domestic market is unrealistically high.
Behavioural approaches to the home bias puzzle draw upon psychological aspects of individual behaviour. So far, in the literature, the familiarity of companies' overly optimistic predictions of domestic companies' performance and (perceived) subjective competence in the home market have been put forward as possible explanations. These features are difficult to factor into a model of optimal portfolio choice in order to successfully address the issue of the home equity bias. The paper applies behavioural insights such as prospect theory and familiarity and ambiguity aversion to one of the classical problems in finance literature: the investor's optimal asset allocation Fig. 5 . International diversification for US investors e daily data, including short selling constraints. The figure gives the optimal portfolio selection for an international equity portfolio in the G7 Datastream total return equity indices and Emerging Market indices for a US investor including the effects from short selling constraints. Optimal allocations are found using the empirical distribution, using daily data from January 1973 to December 2004, and under the assumption of multivariate normality, for a variety of confidence levels.
under risk. In particular, we investigate the use of downside risk, focusing on negative movements in stock markets for the assessment of risk, to see if the downside risk approach to asset allocation is able to provide greater insight into the home equity bias puzzle. Using monthly MSCI data and daily data from Datastream for the G7 countries we are able to express the risk-return trade-off in financial markets in an alternative way, from a downside risk perspective; shedding new light on the puzzle surrounding the size of the home bias. We find that, contrary to mean-variance portfolio analysis, investors concerned with downside risk tend to hold a larger proportion of their portfolio in domestic equities with increasing aversion to risk. This is captured in the degree of confidence an investor associates with his downside risk constraint in determining the optimal portfolio allocation.
We controlled for robustness in various ways. We first analyzed the risk-return trade-off from the perspective of an US investor by using monthly data for the G7 countries. We also included emerging markets and in a further step included short selling constraints. Furthermore, we increased the number of observations dramatically by using daily return series. This is important given the high percentiles used in the examples. The results were extremely robust to the use of daily data. Daily data are known to deviate more from the assumption of normality and the greater downside risk is captured by the model. At high levels of confidence associated with the portfolio value not dropping below a given level US investors therefore shy away from international diversification. The model results in a greater proportion of equity held in the domestic country than would be the case in a mean-variance world.
We also analyzed the home bias from an international point of view to see if the effect is indeed a worldwide phenomenon. Using both monthly and daily data in the model we report The table gives the optimal portfolio selection for an international equity portfolio in the G7 MSCI equity indices and the Emerging Markets Hong Kong and Singapore for a Japanese, UK, and French investor. Optimal allocations are found for a variety of confidence levels using both the empirical distribution and under the assumption of bivariate normality, using the monthly MSCI data as described in Table 1. the optimal portfolio allocations from the perspective of both Japanese and UK investors. In all cases we checked the results for robustness by including emerging markets and analyzing the results with and without short selling constraints. The empirical results indicate that the model is able to capture the international nature of the home bias phenomenon. Due to the greater downside risk from investing abroad, investors may think globally, but instead prefer to invest locally. The main advantage of this paper is that by focusing on a downside risk model for asset allocation, which centres on the empirical distribution of returns, we can observe historically whether any additional risk, in the form of negatively skewed distributions and excess kurtosis, may play a role in the decision making process in the optimal allocation between domestic and foreign equity. A further advantage of the model is the definition of downside risk. It has been acknowledged in the behavioural finance literature that investors tend to frame their investment decisions, relative to a benchmark. In the downside risk model this benchmark is determined independently, as the domestic equity index or the domestic risk free rate. The ability of the model to incorporate behavioural aspects of investors means that the allocation of equity is more in line with the behaviour of investors in general.
The empirical results have shown the tendency to concentrate risks on a single asset (country) rather than to hold a well diversified portfolio. Clearly, the home bias puzzle is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, and explanations for the empirical results have been developed in the literature. The dissatisfaction with institutional explanations has led to the consideration of additional behavioural explanations such as familiarity, ambiguity aversion, and optimism toward the domestic equity market. The combination of prospect theory agents, who show The table gives the optimal portfolio selection for an international equity portfolio in the G7 equity indices and the Emerging Markets Hong Kong and Singapore for a Japanese, and UK investor, respectively. Optimal allocations are found for a variety of confidence levels using both the empirical distribution and under the assumption of bivariate normality, using the daily data from Datastream as described in Table 5. familiarity and optimism toward their domestic stock market, can help to explain the home bias puzzle in international finance. The model for downside risk is able to incorporate the additional risk involved with investing in foreign equity, and help understand the bias for home equity. It is not surprising then that behavioural aspects from investors more willing to invest locally, or at least domestically are likely to play a crucial role in the decision making process on optimal portfolio allocation. These behavioural aspects are likely to lead to the empirical result that investors hold a greater proportion of their assets domestically than would be the case in a mean-variance world.
The empirical results are of significant interest for further research in asset pricing and portfolio management. It would be of interest to specify a utility function for the downside risk investors' decision to changes in his specification of the confidence level associated with the downside risk constraint for alternative time horizons. This would enable a direct test of the downside risk approach against the consumption-based approach in finance theory.
